Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 78
Issue 2
SYMPOSIUM
Post Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use
Controls

2013

Introduction to the Symposium
Christopher Serkin
Gregg Macey

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Christopher Serkin & Gregg Macey, Introduction to the Symposium, 78 Brook. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol78/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 1

SYMPOSIUM

Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms
of Public Land Use Controls
INTRODUCTION
Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey†
Zoning has had a remarkable run. Municipal zoning
constitutes the central thread in the fabric of regulatory limits
on land. It is among the most influential regulatory tools ever
deployed, largely responsible for the shape of twentieth-century
land development in the United States. But zoning remains
controversial, even as we take it for granted. We decry its
unintended consequences1 and exclusionary applications.2
Traditional zoning is blamed for everything from automobile
dependency, fringe development, and low-density sterility3 to the
racial dynamics of post-Katrina New Orleans.4 Despite these

†

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Associate Professor of Law,
Brooklyn Law School. The authors would like to thank the participants of this
symposium for their thoughtful contributions.
1
Michael Wolf encourages us to consider the themes of “exclusion,
anticompetitiveness, parochialism, and aestheticism” that make an appearance in Justice
Sutherland’s storied validation of zoning in Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See
Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND
THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 253 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S.
Kayden eds., 1989); see also JONATHAN BARNETT, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS:
IMPROVING THE NEW CITY, RESTORING THE OLD CITY, RESHAPING THE REGION 47 (1995).
2
Juliana Maantay, Zoning Law, Health, and Environmental Justice: What’s the
Connection?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 572, 579-83 (2002); Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The
Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 101.
3
See, e.g., Edward H. Ziegler, The Case for Megapolitan Growth
Management in the 21st Century: Regional Urban Planning and Sustainable
Development in the United States, 41 URB. LAW. 147, 150-51 (2009).
4
See, e.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved
with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1189-91 (2007). For an account of progressive-era programs in
New Orleans and their influence over the racialization of disaster vulnerability, see
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and other criticisms, zoning persists and remains faithful to its
original goal: separating incompatible uses of land.5
Zoning, of course, has not been a completely static
institution.6 Planners have introduced new tools like incentive,
performance, and overlay zoning.7 But even these innovations
continue to take the separation of land by use as their point of
departure. New, twenty-first-century challenges are likely to
require more dramatic reconsiderations of land use controls.
Issues like sea-level rise, the breakdown of the urban
“transect,” and novel sources of fine-grained externalities
within communities are putting greater pressure on zoning.
Will zoning be able to address change at new varieties of scale?
In the words of Justice Sutherland, will zoning adequately
“expand or contract” in response to changed circumstances as
sublocal and global changes mount?8
In the spring of 2012, the Brooklyn Law Review
assembled a group of the nation’s leading land use experts to
consider these questions in a symposium broadly titled, PostZoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use Controls. Their
papers, assembled in this issue, provide a snapshot of cuttingedge thinking about land use policy. Several themes emerged
from the symposium, including a focus on sublocal decision
making and broader questions of scale, a need to generate
information about land use impacts, an expansion of zoning’s
goals, and a reconsideration of legal limits in response to these
trends. Underlying the papers is a push to grapple with
zoning’s ability to respond to change, particularly at different
scales. Taken together, the authors in this issue call for
considerably broader thinking about zoning’s purpose and
function in light of new pressures on land use. In this
introduction, we set the stage for this collection of papers,
briefly exploring zoning’s origins and its traditionally limited

Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental Equity in New
Orleans, 1890–1930, 28 J. HIST. GEO. 237 (2002).
5
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926) (“[T]he
exclusion of buildings devoted to business, trade, etc., from residential districts, bears a
rational relation to the health and safety of the community.”).
6
Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 481 (2011).
7
See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the
Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 586 (1972); Luther L.
McDougal, III, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47
TUL. L. REV. 255, 257 (1973); Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New
Urbanism on Local Ordinances: The Twilight of Zoning?, 35 URB. LAW. 783, 785 (2003).
8
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
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repertoire for anticipating needs and adjusting to change—
whether within districts or across vast regions.
Zoning emerged as an alternative to common law
responses to development pressures.9 The co-location of homes
and manufacturing facilities, even before the Industrial
Revolution took hold, revealed the common law’s limited ability
to regulate incompatible land uses. Nuisance law relied on caseby-base litigation between neighbors—that is, ex post
adjudication of land use conflicts. What was needed instead was
a mechanism for preventing such conflicts before they occurred.
Zoning offered one. Early codes separated slaughterhouses from
homes, and industry from residential neighborhoods more
generally.10 These ordinances evolved into controls of use as well
as height, bulk, and location of structures on parcels in Los
Angeles,11 New York City, and elsewhere, ultimately culminating
in the Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).12
Underlying the early promulgation of comprehensive
zoning was an implicit faith in planners’ capacity to anticipate
and shape future development needs. In part, we can trace this
faith to methods of scientific inquiry that prevailed in the first
half of the twentieth century. For example, ecology—a branch
of biological science concerned with the interconnectedness of
living systems and their environments—became an established
field just as industrial activity started to pressure
neighborhoods and commercial districts, threatening their
quality of life.13 Zoning followed one of ecology’s early
methodologies of dividing natural areas into sections, taking a
representative sample of those areas, and carefully counting
the organisms they contained.14 This technique, known as the
quadrat method, lent an impression of stable “life zones” and
spoke to a deeply embedded belief among scientists in the
“balance of nature.”15 Ecologists from this era embraced “end9

For private law’s limited ability to anticipate and remedy local
environmental harms, see Edward Brunet, Debunking Wholesale Private Enforcement
of Environmental Rights, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313-18 (1992).
10
See, e.g., 1871 Mass. Acts 534, ch. 167, available at http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/
actsResolves/1871/1871acts0167.pdf; NEW HAVEN, CONN., ORDINANCES §§ 253-54 (1898),
available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nnc1.cu56571828.
11
See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Ex Parte Quong Wo, 118
P. 714, 715 (Cal. 1911); Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 72 P. 970 (Cal. 1903).
12
SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 147, 201-02 (1969).
13
Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science
on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 849 (1994).
14
Id. at 851.
15
Id. at 855-56; see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of
Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 7-8 (1996).
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state” planning, arguing that “succession,” the “process[] by
which one plant community replaces another in successive
waves[,] . . . would end in a climax state, at which point . . . the
landscape [would reach] its natural condition of equilibrium.”16
When the Commerce Department promulgated the SZEA as
model legislation for the states, the idea of succession had
migrated to urban planning as an approach to identify the
“highest and best use” of land and protect that use as it was
reached.17 Herein was zoning’s implicit argument against
common law land use controls: they did not ensure predictable
remedies or encourage stable outcomes. In order to achieve
that, one needed the equivalent of urban “quadrats” that
contained building stock of various classifications.
Zoning assumed, among other things, that “similar uses
in cities tend to congregate to form homogeneous units readily
identifiable by the technical expert,” that “urban land values in
cities shift on a slow and consistent basis,” and that “past
trends can be extrapolated into the future.”18 These ideas were
integrated into the SZEA, which most state legislatures quickly
adopted.19 The SZEA envisioned comprehensive municipal
controls dividing jurisdictions into use districts of varying
intensities. Single-family residential communities would be
protected from noxious industry, and commercial uses would be
clustered together.20 The basic rationale for zoning extended
beyond what court-made doctrine could accomplish and
promised greater foresight than disparate nuisance-prevention
efforts. But the early science of ecology proved to be incorrect.
Ecology has since adopted a “nonequilibrium” paradigm that is
more aware of the extent to which natural systems can be
engineered.21 And the aims of local governments and the forces
that threaten stability today share little with the nuisanceinternalization concerns of a century ago.
Zoning has not stood still in the years since it was first
adopted. Its complexity increased considerably during the
16

Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 13, at 855 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 857 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also M. CHRISTINE BOYER,
DREAMING THE RATIONAL CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 221 (1983).
18
Charles M. Haar, Reflections on Euclid: Social Contract and Private
Purpose, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 343.
19
Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 848-49 (1983).
20
Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willow: Patterns of Land Use
Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870–1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617, 617 n.1 (1991).
21
A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1128-30 (1994).
17
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twentieth century, although it remained focused on separating
uses in increasingly fine-grained ways rather than responding to
new kinds of land use pressures. New York, for example,
amended its zoning resolution over 2000 times between 1916
and 1961.22 In some regions, urban land was at first overzoned
for commercial and industrial uses, a practice that confined
residential zones to limited portions of major cities.23 Land use
categories proliferated, from four in the 1916 resolution to
dozens (or more) in present-day cities such as Fresno and New
York.24 The Boards of Appeals sought to keep up with change,
interpreting vague criteria for whether to grant variance
requests or allow nonconforming uses to reap a reasonable rate
of return.25 Density controls and other zoning improvements in
the 1960s acknowledged zoning’s impact on urban form but
continued to ignore the unique makeup of communities where
they were applied.26 Other innovations, such as floor area
bonuses and incentive zoning techniques, were as likely to yield
a sterile built environment as they were to generate vibrant
public spaces.27 Much of the rift between zoning and land use
challenges in these early decades was to be expected. After all,
at the onset of comprehensive zoning, “supermarkets, chain
stores, and shopping centers [were] unknown,” industries “had
not yet begun to abandon their multistory lofts for suburban

22

See N.Y.C. CITY PLANNING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE
AMENDMENT OF THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (CP-15820), at
696 (1960).
23
William H. Wilson, Moles and Skylarks, in INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING
HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES 88, 97 (Donald A. Krueckeberg ed., 1983) (“[T]he
zoning laws followed New York’s famed 1916 resolution, which permitted, under full
utilization, working space for some 300 million employees. . . . The other side of the
overzoning coin was the underzoning of residential property.”).
24
Compare STANISLAW J. MAKIELSKI, JR., THE POLITICS OF ZONING: THE NEW
YORK EXPERIENCE 36 (1966), with FRESNO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12-201 (2012)
(“Designation
of
Zoning
Districts”),
available
at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=14478, and N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning,
Zoning
Districts:
Introduction
to
Zoning
Districts,
NYC.GOV,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonehis2.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
25
ALEXANDER GARVIN, THE AMERICAN CITY: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T
371 (1996).
26
Id. at 366-67. Kevin Lynch explored what are at times the counterintuitive
links among density, urban form, and quality of life in his classic text, Good City Form.
KEVIN LYNCH, GOOD CITY FORM 261-65 (1981). Density interacts with other elements of
the built environment, including whether the mixture of building types is coarse- or
fine-grained, and the spatial and temporal distribution of access channels. Id. at 265-75.
27
JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK CITY
EXPERIENCE 11-18 (2000).
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locations,” and “[c]ars, trucks, and planes had not yet become
the dominant forms of transportation.”28
In the face of so much change, zoning today has become
at once overly simplistic and stultifyingly complex. Even with
its many innovations, zoning has remained true to its original
goals. It ignores demographic shifts and design implications
while making it difficult to comply with existing ordinances
through the use of overlays, conditions, and exceptions.
Criticisms of zoning’s implicit pursuit of steady-state
development are hardly new, raised most eloquently by Jane
Jacobs in the 1960s.29 Zoning has had time to internalize
Jacobs’s observations—most notably, her argument that mixeduse developments, particularly on larger parcels, generate
positive externalities and contribute to more vital urban
space.30 Planned unit developments and overlay districts can be
conducive to the kinds of communities that she envisioned. But
these techniques are effectively add-ons—regulatory tweaks
that operate within zoning’s existing framework. Zoning’s
fundamental structure remains largely unchanged. It is what
zoning is called upon to do that looks very different.
For example, modern development pressures draw
much of the motivation for zoning away from planning and
toward fiscal concerns.31 Control over land use decisions gives
municipalities leverage to extract valuable concessions from
developers.32 In principle, those concessions are meant as a
buffer against the costs imposed by development, whether
through localized environmental impacts, burdens on
infrastructure, or broader congestion. But even as developers
make concessions or take steps to offset costs, those offsetting
benefits might not go to those most affected by new projects.
Rent seeking at the local level means that the ultimate
distribution of development benefits may overlook those
bearing costs such as increased traffic and added stress to
municipal services. This inequitable distribution is partly a
problem of the scale of change ushered in by new development.
Scholars have frequently pointed to interlocal externalities
from municipal decisions as a reason for regional or even
28

GARVIN, supra note 25, at 364.
JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 252 (1961).
30
Jay Wickersham, Jane Jacobs’s Critique of Zoning: From Euclid to
Portland and Beyond, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 553-54 (2001).
31
Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63
STAN. L. REV. 591, 604-06 (2011).
32
Cf. Rose, supra note 19, at 890-91.
29
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federal planning.33 But the problem of concentrated sublocal
harms points to a different manifestation of the scale problem.
It suggests that land use decisions may sometimes occur at a
higher level than necessary—at the level of the municipality,
instead of the more proximate community.
Zoning has reached something of a crossroads. Issues of
scale in response to change are increasingly important, while
the objectives that underlie zoning are newly up for grabs. It is
against this backdrop that the papers in this issue push the
discussion forward in important new directions.
In this symposium, zoning’s role in allocating costs and
benefits to address sublocal change is most explicit in Rachel
Godsil’s discussion of gentrification.34 Her contribution to this
issue poses a deceptively simple question for zoning: to what
degree should it privilege the interests of existing (“in-place”)
residents during times of dramatic demographic change? From
the perspective of a municipality, opposition to gentrification may
be interpreted as irrational or self-defeating. But gentrification
reflects improvements in the economic conditions of an area that
not everyone will embrace. Godsil looks closely at the sublocal
distributional consequences of gentrification and the racial
dynamics at work. Finding that gentrification can unfairly disrupt
existing communities, Godsil proposes a series of responses to
protect the interests of in-place residents, spanning from rent
regulation or housing vouchers in gentrifying communities to
active involvement by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development to “[a]ffirmatively [f]urther[] [f]air [g]entrification.”35
William Fischel shares Godsil’s interest in using zoning
at the sublocal level to resist broader municipal trends. Fischel
identifies a gap in land use controls that falls between citywide
zoning and consensual neighborhood covenants.36 That gap
persists, despite the rise of homeowner associations and related
private governance tools. There are two reasons for this. First,
private associations often fail to take hold in built-up areas.
Second, neighborhoods that are part of larger polities have less
33

See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1996); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land
Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1404-08 (2012); Laurie Reynolds,
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78
WASH. L. REV. 93, 109 (2003).
34
See Rachel D. Godsil, The Gentrification Trigger: Autonomy, Mobility, and
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 319 (2013).
35
Id. at 337.
36
See William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The New Belt
and Suspenders of Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339 (2013).
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influence over changed conditions than those featured in
Fischel’s “homevoter” model of small-town and suburban
politics.37 According to Fischel, one possible answer to the lack of
“voice” for residents of such communities during times of change
is the neighborhood conservation district (NCD).38 This
innovation embodies the promise of preservation without the
need to wrestle with historic designation.39 NCDs give sublocal
communities the power to review proposed land use changes and
enact through public law a subset of the protections against
change that are available to common interest communities.40
They offer immediate neighbors the ability to protect their
interests more directly than through broader municipal decision
making. Of course, adding a layer of regulatory authority
increases the costs of change. And neighborhood conservation
districts present a problem that Godsil identifies: how to set out
the appropriate level of protection for neighborhoods within larger
polities. But the framework and restrictions that NCDs introduce
offer a creative expression of pressure for sublocal involvement in
how a municipality manages and responds to change.
Community benefits agreements (CBAs) offer another.
As Alejandro Camacho explains, they give community-based
organizations—a different kind of sublocal concern—both a
voice in the development process and an opportunity to protect
members’ interests by extracting promises from developers.41
Camacho points out that zoning’s flexibility historically derived
from bilateral negotiation with regulators over variances,
conditional use permits, or development agreements. These
approaches often left out the interests of community groups.
Equally important, the bilateral model discouraged monitoring
and adjustment of zoning decisions—institutional mechanisms
that are necessary to respond to changed circumstances.42
Because CBAs include a series of promises that burden and run
with the land, they set the groundwork for relationship
building that can facilitate contingency planning among

37

Id. at 345; see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4,
14-16 (2001).
38
See Adam Lovelady, Note, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and
the Role of Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 40 URB. LAW. 147, 148-54 (2008).
39
Id. at 154.
40
Compare Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO.
L.J. 697, 710-14 (2010), with Lovelady, supra note 38, at 148-54.
41
Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not the
Antidote, of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 355, 361-63, 365 (2013).
42
Id. at 360-61.
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numerous parties.43 The challenges of representation, coalition
formation, capacity building, and enforcement posed by CBAs
are legion.44 But CBAs are an increasingly prevalent tool for
responding to development-driven, sublocal change.
The proposals for sublocal control in this issue are
balanced by an emphasis on more disaggregated responses to
change. Lee Fennell’s proposal to crowdsource information about
land use preferences, intentions, and impacts is a clear example.45
Traditional zoning relies on imperfect information. Most
crucially, it inadequately addresses impacts of use-based
planning experienced on adjacent land or across successive
periods of ownership. Instead, zoning is informed by vague
assumptions—for instance, that one type of use will have certain
effects on another, or that the scale of development pursued
today will remain efficient during some later time period.
Planners bridge these information shortfalls with sophisticated
tools like hedonic regression analysis, but they populate their
models with proxies and use them to generate forecasts rather
than actual impacts.46 Fennell’s project encourages the public to
reveal information about land use intensity and quality of life
through smartphones and other platforms.47 This would replace—
or supplement—planners’ technical expertise with facts on the
ground. But measuring impacts is, in a sense, an ex post
treatment of sublocal externalities. New tools for gauging ambient
noise and air quality can only speak to existing conditions. Such
information can inform future decision making, but it is otherwise
limited to the effects of decisions already made. Fennell therefore
proposes another information-based approach: an options
exchange that elicits data about future preferences and desires.48
This proposal seeks to reveal consumer preference information
and “execute binding property instruments” to lock in those
preferences over time.49
Stewart Sterk provides another method to harness the
power of market mechanisms. Sterk reviews existing
43

Id. at 367.
Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government
Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 21-31 (2010).
45
Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 387 (2013).
46
Models in support of regulatory behavior pose a variety of limitations and
concerns. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual,
Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 293, 308-13 (2010).
47
Fennell, supra note 45, at 392-93.
48
See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 24-31 (2011).
49
Fennell, supra note 45, at 402.
44
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approaches to limiting “localized externalities” (and those that
extend beyond a development’s immediate environs) and hones
in on the added costs of these approaches: they establish
unrelated restrictions, cater to a skewed mix of organized
interests, and rely on rules that are both underinclusive and
overinclusive.50 His solution is for local governments to price
the effects of land uses and allow property owners to adjust
accordingly. Sterk suggests that land use regulations could be
augmented by taxes that are better tailored to the externalized
costs of development and avoid the problems attendant to
discretionary review.51 This differs from Fennell’s proposal for
an options-pricing scheme because a centralized authority
rather than a market would price externalities. But once prices
are set, the market would give property owners what amounts
to a menu of options at pre-specified prices. Supplementing
zoning with development taxes expands the options available
for adding fine-grained flexibility to land use controls.
A final attempt to expand zoning’s flexibility can be
found in the use of land transfer programs that direct, rather
than respond to, development patterns. Chief among these
efforts is the repurposing of transferable development rights
(TDRs). TDRs are not new, but Vicki Been and John Infranca
argue that New York City utilizes them to replace traditional
forms of flexibility such as upzonings and zoning lot mergers.52
In the past, developers sought exemptions from strict zoning
limits by merging lots to create greater bulk limits or
requesting rezoning to a more permissive designation. But
these options faced structural limitations—the former
requiring ownership of lots to merge, and the latter requiring
affirmative regulatory action. TDRs themselves have been used
primarily to relieve the rigidity of existing zoning designations.
Now, New York and other cities are departing more completely
from zoning constraints through subdistricting designations
and TDRs built into comprehensive redevelopment efforts.53 As
many of the authors in this issue point out, land use controls
fail to address change when they proceed from a limited
analysis of the impacts they will encourage. The same is true of
transfer programs, which were applied at times without
50

Stewart E. Sterk, Exploring Taxation as a Substitute for Overregulation in
the Development Process, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 417, 422-23 (2013).
51
Id. at 431-34.
52
Vicki Been & John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs:
“Post-Zoning”?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 435, 438 (2013).
53
Id. at 439-40.
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sufficient awareness of urban design consequences or burdens
on landowners. Been and Infranca chronicle how TDRs have
moved beyond the strictures of lot-by-lot density controls.
Often, as in Manhattan’s High Line Transfer Corridor, using
TDRs to direct not only the intensity but also the form of
development has yielded stunning results for the character of
neighborhoods where they are applied.54
In addition to exploring sublocal and disaggregated
responses to change, contributors to this symposium identified
a dramatic expansion in zoning’s objectives. Courts and
commentators have long recognized zoning’s movement beyond
the “orthodox quartet” of permissible police power regulations:
“health, safety, morals, [and] general welfare” (at least as
narrowly drawn).55 With the New Deal expansion of the scope of
the police power came opportunities to use zoning authority to
pursue broader goals.56 One such goal is conservation, which fits
uneasily within traditional land use controls. While zoning can
limit growth in an area, it is generally ill-suited to prevent
growth altogether. Some local governments adopt “holding
zones” by, say, designating large swaths of land for agricultural
use only.57 But this raises a host of doctrinal problems, imposes
significant burdens on affected property owners without
corresponding benefits, and—at least where the goal is
conservation—amounts to a regulatory sleight of hand, treating
agricultural use as synonymous with conservation.
Conservation easements have emerged as a tool for local
governments to pursue conservation directly, as a kind of
private-law alternative to zoning. Gerald Korngold points out
that local governments increasingly acquire conservation
easements, and he notes that this affects land’s development
potential as much as, if not more than, traditional zoning.58 If at
a later time municipalities adopt different conservation
strategies, they can modify or release the easements they hold.
54

Id. at 449-52.
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 114-15 (3d ed. 2005).
56
For a history of the expansion of police power regulations and its impact on
land use regulation, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom
Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 838-74
(2006). A classic battleground for this expansion is in the area of aesthetic regulation.
See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 55, at 469-505.
57
Gerald Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements: A Means to
Advance Efficiency, Freedom from Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 BROOK. L.
REV. 467, 472-76 (2013).
58
Id.
55
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By comparison, a municipality must use eminent domain to
eliminate privately held conservation easements.59 In addition,
conservation easements give local governments a means to
implement more fine-grained decisions. Instead of requiring a
zoning ordinance to distinguish among the environmental
sensitivity of various parcels—an endeavor that could require
lot-level distinctions—a government can acquire conservation
easements over the precise property it wants to protect.
A similar expansion of regulatory purpose, driven by the
changing scale of land use impacts, is on display in the use of
development controls to anticipate sea-level rise. According to
John Nolon, Euclidian zoning was complicit in this country’s
pattern of sprawl development.60 Separating incompatible uses
encouraged segregation of homes, jobs, and commercial needs,
leading—in many places—to the consumption of open space
and a reliance on cars for commuting and errands. Built
structures themselves are responsible for a tremendous
amount of energy use in the United States, and building codes
and design requirements also influence carbon emissions.
Thus, local land use regulations arguably contribute to sealevel rise. A concern for sea-level rise, and for climate change
more generally, encourages the deployment of municipal land
use and building regulations to create transit-oriented
development and more energy-efficient buildings. This, of
course, reflects an expansion of the traditional purposes of
zoning and land use controls. Instead of separating
incompatible uses, the goal is to minimize environmental
impacts on a broader scale—to limit, in essence, the global
externalities of local land use decisions, as opposed to smallerscale externalities among neighbors. Nolon explores a
combination of development-control and informational
mechanisms to preserve natural floodplains, protect streams
and “soft” barriers against the sea, and reveal risks attendant
to inundation of development in the future. The goal is to
encourage developers to account for the risks of sea-level rise in
siting decisions and project design.
Nicole Garnett’s examination of form-based codes
speaks to another expansion of regulatory purpose: focusing on
59
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the form of built structures rather than the use of land.61 The
goal of form-based codes is to create municipalities with certain
design features and more dense urban cores. Proponents of
form-based codes advocate “scrap[ping] traditional zoning
codes, which regulate based upon property uses, in favor of a
regulatory system that targets building density and form.”62 As is
true of each of the innovations chronicled in this issue, formbased codes present their own risks. First, they are meant to
supplement zoning according to the “transect,” the supposed
progression of development from urban to less-intense uses of
land. Form-based codes dictate the architectural elements that
should proliferate along different parts of the urban transect. In
practice, development does not adhere to this planning principle:
it might follow more uniform density gradients, as in Los
Angeles, or proceed along alternating gradients, as in Phoenix.
But with new forms and purposes of municipal land use
controls come new risks. Garnett worries, for example, that the
embrace of form-based codes can micromanage the details of
building forms, making the codes both difficult to follow and
inappropriate
impositions
of
aesthetic
preferences.63
Crowdsourcing information also raises complicated issues of
participation and voice. If data collection is more available to
some people than others, their concerns may be given greater
weight in land use decisions.64 Likewise, CBAs raise difficult
questions of representation, with the developer often driving the
process without the benefit of procedural safeguards such as
those found in New York City’s Uniform Land Use Review
Process.65 Some of the approaches, including NCDs, add layers of
approval or otherwise increase the cost of regulatory compliance,
potentially restricting the supply of new developments.66
With a sense of these concerns, Richard Epstein adds a
cautionary note to the project of exploring the scale of land use
controls and the management of change.67 As he quite rightly
anticipates, the principal concern of the papers in this
symposium is that “zoning law has proved inadequate to
61
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grapple with all the complex issues of land use, so that
additional systems are needed in order to pick up the slack.”68
For Epstein, this is troubling because the legal—and
specifically, constitutional—protections for property owners are
already insufficient to address traditional forms of regulatory
incursion. He argues that much of the intellectual foundation for
that protection is based on a misunderstanding of the
relationship between states’ police power and the Takings
Clause.69 Instead of the ad hoc balancing test that informs
takings jurisprudence, Epstein argues for the application of
more bright-line rules, designed to protect property owners from
implicit expropriations under the guise of regulation. Epstein
would no doubt agree that judicial oversight of the regulatory
innovations described in this issue is even more up for grabs.
Stepping back from the details of this exceptional
collection of papers, each shares a concern over traditional
zoning’s ability to respond to changing conditions and a desire
to replace (or at least to augment) top-down, technocratic
decision making with more responsive controls at different
scales. What is most striking about the contributions, then, is
their unusually bold modesty. This is not an oxymoron. The
proposals are innovative, from crowdsourcing zoning
preferences to implementing neighborhood conservation
districts and replacing development controls with land use
taxes. But they reflect a certain skepticism about zoning’s
ability to achieve optimal land use outcomes. Part of this comes
from the broader range of externalities that land use
regulations are meant to confront. The focus reflected in these
papers is no longer—at least not exclusively—the kinds of
municipal conflicts that zoning historically was meant to
forestall. The focus is simultaneously narrower and broader,
from the sublocal effects of gentrification to global concerns
such as climate change. Whether or not zoning can adapt to
these sources of concern, there can be little doubt that the postzoning world is fast approaching. It heralds new, and at times
unique, threats to public welfare. The legal system will have to
account for them as it continues to evolve. The first step in
understanding that evolution is to recognize the changes that
are underway. The papers in this symposium focus our
attention on those changes.
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